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essary and would not serve any legitimate state interest. Id. Moreover, in
"dysfunctional" families, where the parents were divorced or the second parent
otherwise did not participate in the
upbringing of the child, the Court found
that the requirement actually disserved
the state's interest in protecting and
assisting the minor. Id The Court noted
that the record revealed the two-parent
notification requirement to often result
in major trauma to the child as well as
the parent, and to violate the privacy of
the parent and child even when they
suffered no other physical or psychological harm. Id. The Court wrote: "The
state has no more interest in requiring
all family members to talk with one
another than it has in requiring certain
ofthem to live together... [n ]or can any
state interest in protecting a parent's
interest in shaping a child's values and
lifestyle overcome the liberty interests
of a minor acting with the consent of a
single parent or court." Id. at 2946. The
Court found that the separate interest of
one parent combined with the minor's
privacy interest outweighs the separate
interest of the second parent. The Court
therefore held the two-parent notification requirement, standing alone, to be
unconstitutional.Id. at 2947.
The Court concluded, however, that
the bypass procedure provided in the
statute rendered the entire statute constitutional. Id. The Court noted
the district court's finding that the bypass procedure produced fear and anxiety among minors and that, of the
judges who adjudicated 90% of the
bypass petitions in 1981, none identified any positive effects of the law. Id. at
2940. However, the Court followed precedent set by earlier cases wherein the
Court determined that statutes requiring parental consent to a minor's abortion would be upheld so long as they
provided an alternative procedure
"whereby a minor may demonstrate that
she is sufficiently mature to make the
abortion decision herself or that, despite her immaturity, an abortion would
be in her best interests." Id. at 2948
(citing Planned Parenthood Ass'n of
Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 462
u.s. 467, 491 (1983); Bellotti v. Baird,
443 u.s. 622, 643-644 (1979)).
Turning to the constitutionality of the
statute's 48-hour waiting period, the
Court recognized concerns expressed
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by the district court that such a waiting
requirement might delay the abortion
and thereby increase the risk of the
abortion procedure, but found the waiting period itself to be reasonable and to
impose a minimal burden on the mother's
right to decide whether to terminate the
pregnancy. The Court stated:
"The brief waiting period provides
the parent the opportunity to consult with his or her spouse and a
family physician, and it permits the
parent to inquire into the competency of the doctor performing the
abortion, discuss the religiOUS or
moral implications of the abortion
decision, and provide the daughter needed guidance and counsel
in evaluating the impact of the
decision on her future."
Id. at 2944.
Through this decision, the Supreme
Court has authorized states to impose
upon a minor seeking an abortion the
additional burden of either notifying
both of· her parents, regardless of
whether one is alienated or disinterested, or obtaining the approval of a
judge who has little or no knowledge of
her circumstances. In that the Supreme
Court has approved the mechanism of a
judicial bypass procedure to render an
otherwise invalid statute constitutional,
one may only speculate as to future
unconstitutional statutory obstacles
which may be placed in a pregnant
minor's path so long as similar judicial
alternatives are prOvided.
- Rikke Davis

Maryland v. Craig: MARYLAND
STATUTE ALLOWING ONE-WAY
CLOSED CIRCUIT TELEVISION
TESTIMONY OF CHILD ABUSE
VICTIMS DID NOT VIOLATE THE
CONFRONT ATION CLAUSE OF
THE SIXTH AMENDMENT
In Maryland v. Craig, 110 S. Ct. 3157
( 1990), the United States Supreme Court
upheld a Maryland statute providing for
one-way closed circuit television testimony by an alleged child abuse victim.
The decision overruled the Court of
Appeals of Maryland, which held that
the State's showing of the necessity to
prevent eye-to-eye confrontation was
insufficient to invoke the statute's protection.
Sandra Ann Craig was indicted in
October, 1986 by a Maryland grand jury

on various counts of child and sexual
abuse. Six year old Brooke Etze, the
named victim in each count had attended
a preschool and kindergarten center
owned and operated by Craig.
Prior to the case proceeding to trial,
state prosecutors attempted to invoke a
Maryland statutory procedure that allowed a judge to permit testimony of an
alleged child abuse victim by one-way
closed circuit television. Section 9-102
of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings
Article provided that the trial judge
must first "determin[e] that the testimony by the child victim in the courtroom [WOUld] result in the child suffering serious emotional distress such that
the child [could not] reasonably communicate." Id. at 3161 n.1 (quoting
Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc. Code Ann.
§ 9-102(a)( 1 )(ii) (1989)). Once such
a determination was made, the child
witness, the state prosecutor, and the
defense counsel would proceed to a
separate room while the judge, the jury,
and the defendant remained in the courtroom. The child witness would then be
subject to direct examination by the
state's attorney, cross-examination by
the defendant's attorney, and any questions the judge might wish to ask the
child. The examination would be recorded bya video monitor which simultaneously displays the witness' testimony in the courtroom. According to
the procedure, the defendant would
remain in communication with his attorney, but not with the child witness.
Any objections made by either attorney
would be ruled on by the judge in the
courtroom.
In support of its invocation of the
statutory procedure, the state's attorney
offered expert testimony that Brooke,
testifying in Craig's presence, would
have suffered the required serious emotional distress such that she could not
have reasonably communicated. Craig
objected, arguing that the procedure violated the Confrontation Clause of the
Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. The trial court rejected
that challenge, stating that while the
procedure took away the physical confrontation between the witness and the
accuser, the statute preserves the "essence" of the constitutional right. The
procedure allowed the defendant the
right to observe, cross-examine, and

have the fact/finder view the demeanor
of the witness. Craig, 110 S. Ct. at 316162. The trial court also found that the
evidence presented by the expert sufficiently justified the finding that serious
emotional distress impairing the child's
ability to testify would have resulted if
the child was required to testifY in the
courtroom. Thus. the trial court allowed
Brooke to testify against Craig via oneway closed circuit television. Craig was
convicted. and the court of special appeals upheld the conviction. Id.
Craig petitioned the Court of Appeals
of Maryland. which reversed and remanded for a new trial. Although the
court rejected Craig's Confrontation
Clause argument. it held that the State
made an insufficient showing of' the
required emotional distress the testifying would have had upon the children.
thus failing to satisfy the high threshold
required by Coy v. Iowa, 487 u.s. 1012
(1988). Craig, 110 S. Ct. at 3162. The
United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari to resolve the Confrontation
Clause issues.
The opinion of the Supreme Court
initially focused on its holding in Coy v.
Iowa. The Court stated that while they
had held in Coy that '''the Confrontation
Clause guarantee [d] the defendant a
face-to-face meeting with witnesses appearing before the trier offact[,]'" they
had not held that there existed an absolute right to a face-to-face confrontation.
Id. (quoting Coy. 487 U.S. at 1016). The
Coy Court expressly stated that the
question of whether exceptions to the
right existed were not addressed in its
opinion. but noted that any exceptions
"'would surely be allowed only when
necessary to further an important public
policy,' i.e.. only upon a showing of
something more than the generalized.
'legislatively imposed presumption of
trauma... •Id. at 3163 (quoting Coy. 487
U.S. at 1021).
The Court stated that "[ t] he central
concern of the Confrontation Clause
[was] to ensure the reliability of the evidence against a criminal defendant by
subjecting it to rigorous testing in the
context of an adversary proceeding before the trier of fact." Id. Furthermore.
the clause's purposes were served by the
combined effect of the presence of four
essential elements: physical presence of
the witness. testimony under oath. crossexamination by the defense. and obser-

vation of demeanor by the trier of fact.
Id. The Court acknowledged that a faceto-face confrontation enhanced the accuracy of evidence by reducing the risk
offalsehood or erroneous identification.
but recognized that it was not an indispensable element of the right. Id. at
3164. If the other elements of the right
are satisfied. the Confrontation Clause
may be satisfied despite the absence of a
face-to-face confrontation. Id. In support of its conclusion. the Court looked
to the long history of the admission of
hearsay statements against the defendant
and concluded that to apply the Confrontation Clause literally would abrogate virtually every hearsay exception. a
result directly at odds with existing case
law.ld. at 3165.
The Court. therefore. concluded that
while the Confrontation Clause reflected
a preference for face-to-face confrontation. it was a preference that '''must
occasionally give way to considerations
of public policy and the necessities of
the case [.]'" Itt (quoting Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237. 243 (1895
However. "a defendant's right to confront accusatory witnesses may be satisfied absent a physical. face-to-face confrontation at trial only where denial of
such confrontation [was] necessary to
further an important public policy and
only where the reliability of the testimony [was] otherwise assured." Id. at
3166.
The Court then turned its inquiry to
the Maryland statutory procedure at
issue. Significantly. they found that the
Maryland statute. while denying face-toface confrontation. preserved the other
important elements of the confrontation right. Id. Therefore. the Court concluded that the "use of the one-way
closed-circuit television procedure.
where necessary to further an important
state interest. [did] not impinge upon
the truth-seeking or symbolic purposes
of the Confrontation Clause." Id. at
3167.
The Court next proceeded to determine what it thought to be the critical
issue in the case. "whether use of the
procedure was indeed necessary to
further an important state interest." Id.
The state contended that its important
interest was that of protecting alleged
victims of child abuse from the traumatic experience of testifying face-toface against the alleged perpetrator of

».

such abuse. and that the procedure was
necessary to further that interest. Itt
The Court agreed that this was a sufficiently compelling reason and noted
that a majority of states have enacted
similar statutes. Id. Accordingly. the
Court held:
[I]f the State makes an adequate
showing of necessity. the state
interest in protecting child witnesses from the trauma of testifying in a child abuse case is sufficiently important to justify the use
of a special procedure that permits
a child witness in such cases to
testify at trial against a defendant
in the absence of face-to-face confrontation with the defendant.
Id. at 3169.
The Court emphasized that a finding
of necessity must be made on a case by
case basis. based on whether the use of
the procedure was necessary to protect
the welfare of that particular child. Id.
The trial court must also find the child
witness to be traumatized by the presence of the defendant. not just by the
general experience of testifying in a
courtroom. Id. Finally. the trial court
must find that the emotional distress
subjected upon the child by the face-toface confrontation would be more than
de minimis. Id.
Regarding the opinion of the court of
appeals. the Court found that the lowt!r
court had imposed unnecessarily strict
requirements as a prerequisite to the
finding of necessity. I d. at 3171. The
Court opined that the court of appeals
incorrectly interpreted Coy to require
that the child witness be actually questioned in the defendant's presence. and
a determination be made as to "whether
a child would suffer 'severe emotional
distress' if he or she were to testify by
two-way closed circuit television." Id. at
3170 (emphasis in original). Conversely. the Court found that testimony of
expert witnesses as to the effect on the
child would suffice. and that actual
observation of the effects of face-to-face
confrontation was not necessary. Itt at
3171. Thus. because the court of appeals
did not base its determination of the
absence of necessity on the lower threshold found by the Court in this case. the
Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings.ld.
Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Bren-
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nan, Marshall and Stevens, filed a dissenting opinion and argued that the
majority's holding was in direct conflict
with the plain meaning of the Confrontation Clause. The dissenters attacked
the majority's analogy to the admission
of hearsay evidence, noting that the
hearsay exceptions generally included a
requirement of the unavailability of the
declarant, a point which the majority
seemed to ignore. Id. at 3174 (Scalia,].,
dissenting). Concluding, the dis.sent
stated: "The Court today has applied 'interest balancing' analysis where the text
of the Constitution simply does not
permit it. We are not free to conduct a
cost-benefit analysis of clear and explicit
constitutional guarantees, and then to
adjust their meaning to comport to our
findings." Id. at 3176 (Scalia,]., dissenting). "[T]he text of the Sixth Amendment is clear, and because the Constitution is meant to protect against, rather
than conform to, current 'widespread
belief,' I respectfully dissent." Id. at
3172 (Scalia,]., dissenting).
The opinion of the Supreme Court in
Maryland v. Craig validates a procedure
which will greatly increase the State's
ability to successfully prosecute alleged
perpetrators of child abuse. Perhaps
more importantly, this opinion reveals
the willingness of the current Court to
look beyond the literal meaning of constitutional guarantees and instead concentrate on the "essence" of the right,
thereby preserving the notion of the
Constitution as a flexible document.
- Gregory J. Swain
Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co.:
OPINIONS ARE NOT
PROTECTED BY THE FIRST
AMENDMENT AND ARE
THEREFORE ACTIONABLE
UNDER STATE UBEL LAW
In Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co.,
110 S. Ct. 2695 ( 1990) the United States
Supreme Court held that statements of
opinion are not protected by the first
amendment and, therefore, are actionable under state libel law. In holding so,
the Court reversed the Ohio Court of
Appeals and remanded the case for a
determination as to whether the statements were true or false.
Lorain Journal Co. published an article authored by J. Theodore Diadiun
(hereinafter "respondents") including
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incriminating comments about the petitioner, Michael Milkovich, a high school
wrestling coach whose team was involved in an altercation following a
match. Milkovich and Scott, the school
superintendent, testified at the Ohio
High School Athletic Association
(OHSAA) investigatory hearing and subsequent trial. Both proceedings were
discussed in a journal article entitled
"Maple beat the law with the 'big lie,'''
along with a picture of Diadiun and the
words "TO says." Among other phrases,
the article contained the following passage: "Anyone who attended the meet...
knows in his heart that Milkovich and
Scott lied at the hearing after each having given his solemn oath to tell the
truth." Id. at 2698. Thus, Milkovich and
Scott brought separate defamation actions against the respondents in Ohio
State Court. Id. at 2699.
Milkovich alleged that the article directly damaged his occupation of coach
and teacher by accusing him of committing perjury, and that this constituted
libel per se. Id. A directed verdict was
granted in favor of the respondents on
the grounds that there was insufficient
evidence to establish "actual malice" as
required by New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). Milkovich,
110 S. Ct. at 2699. The Ohio Court of
Appeals disagreed and the decision was
reversed and remanded. Id. at 2700.
On remand, the trial court granted
the respondent's motion for summary
judgment, holding that the article con·
stituted opinion constitutionally protected from a libel action. Alternatively,
the court found that Milkovich, as a public figure, failed to make out a prima
facie case of actual malice. The court of
appeals affirmed. Id
On appeal, the Supreme Court of
Ohio found that Milkovich was neither a
public figure nor a public official. The
court also held that the statements were
factual assertions as a matter of law and
not constitutionally protected as the
opinions of the writer. Id
Two years later, the Ohio Supreme
Court reversed its position in Scott's
defamation action, finding that the column was constitutionally protected
opinion Id. The Scott court, in ascertaining whether the column was fact or
opinion under the totality of the circumstances, applied the four factor

analysis established by the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia in
Oilman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970 (D.C.
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127
(1985). Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2700.
Those factors were "( 1) 'the specific
language used;' (2) 'whether the statement is verifiable;' (3) 'the general context of the statement;' and (4) 'the
broader context in which the statement
appeared.'" Id. (quoting Scott v. NewsHerald, 25 Ohio St. 3d 243, 250, 496
N.E.2d 699,706 (1986».
Although the Scott court determined that the first two factors indicated that
the statements at issue were assertions
of fact, the court held that based on the
third and fourth factors the article was
opinion as a matter of law. Id. With
respect to the third, "general context of
the statement," factor, "the large caption 'TO says' ... would indicate to even
the most gullible reader that the article
was, in fact, opinion." Id. (quotingScott,
25 Ohio St. 3d at 252, 496 N.E.2d at
707). With respect to the fourth factor,
the "broader context in which the statement appeared," the court reasoned
that because the article appeared on a
sports page - 'a traditional haven for
cajoling, invective, and hyperbole,' that
article would probably be construed as
opinion.Id. at 2701 (quoting Scott, 25
Ohio St. 3d at 253-54, 496 N.E.2d at
708). As a result of the Scott decision
the Ohio Court of Appeals upheld a
summary judgment against Milkovich.
Id. An appeal to the Supreme Court of
Ohio was dismissed for want of a substantial constitutional question, and the
United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari to consider the Ohio court's
recognition of a constitutionally required opinion exception under the
first amendment.
The Supreme Court began its analysis
by discussing the development of defamation law under the common law. The
Court first stressed the importance of
allowing a person to vindicate his good
name while affording redress for harm
caused by defamatory statements. Id. at
2702.
At common law, a defamed private
figure needed only to prove a false publication which subjected him to "hatred,
contempt, or ridicule." Id. (quoting
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S.
323, 370 (1974) (White, ]., dissenting». The distinction between fact and

